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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FRANK FUOCO and ANNA
FUOCO,
Plaintiffs-Appellants.
vs.

I
,

BENJAMIN H. WILLIAMS and
VERNA V. WILLIAMS,

No.

10362

Defendants-Responden t.v.

APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF

STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The trial court erred in holding that it was

bound by the verdict of the jury in the first trial with
respect to the location of the ditch.
2. The respondents have failed to call attention in

their brief to any evidence of mutual recognition of the
ditch as a boundary line over a long period of time.
1

ARGU~IENT

1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLD-

ING THAT IT WAS BOUND BY THE VERDICT OF THE JURY IN THE FIRST TRIAL
WITH RESPECT TO THE LOCATION OF
THE DITCH.
The respondents argue, point A, that the trial
court correctly relied upon the finding made by the
jury in the first trial with respect to the location of
the ditch which is claimed to be the boundary line. They
then argue that the testimony of witnesses as to use of
the land on each side of the disputed boundary line
ditch relates to the ditch in the location found by the
jury and not to a ditch in the location recalled by the
witnesses. For example, on pages 8, 9 and 10 of the
Respondents' Brief reference is made to the testimony
of witnesses Owen Sanders, Frank Young and others relating to use of the property east of the ditch as it existed
20 feet east of the present ditch, and the impression
is given that such testimony refers to the use of land
east of the present ditch.
The fact is that the second trial was a trial de novo.
The findings of the jury in the first trial was not binding upon the litigants and the court in the second trial.
In its memorandum decision dated February 19,
1965, ( R. 26, 27) , the trial court said:
"Much testimony was offered at the time of
the trial of this m~;tter by the respective parties
concerning the location of the irrigation ditch
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in question. However, it would appear from the
Supreme Court's decision that the matter of the
location of the irrigation ditch had already been
determined by the jury on the previous trial and
that that question was not properly before the
Trial Court in this matter.... "
This was clearly error.
The previous judgment of the district court was
reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial.
The pertinent language is as fallows:
"Therefore, the judgment of the trial court is
reversed and remanded for a new trial, with instructions to the effect that the judge or jury
should determine the matters of whether the ditch
was acquiesced in over a long period of time, as a
boundar.IJ and not simply as an irrigation memium. Costs to appellants."
The law is well settled in Utah as in other jurisdictions that when a judgment is reversed it no longer
has any force or e:ffect for any purpose.
I quote from Bouvier's Law dictionary:
"Reverse, Reversed. A term frequently used
in the judgments of an appellate court, in disposing of the case before it. It then means 'to
set aside, to annul, to vacate.' Laithe vs. McDonald ,7 Kans. 254."
In the case of Larsen vs. Gasberg, 30 Utah 470,
86 P. 1906, the judgment of the district court was
reversed. The precise language was:
"The judgment is reversed, with directions to
the lower court to grant a new trial."
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At the subsequent trial the question was raised
as to the effect of the reversal of the judgment. I quote:
" . . . What we do say is that we think it
clearly appears from the opinion that the cause
was remanded for a new trial to give the parties
an opportunity to try the question of fraud, a
matter concerning which appellant had not had
his day in court. Let that be as it may, the
judgment of the lower court was reversed and
the cause remanded without any specific directions except that a new trial should be granted.
The rule is well settled that, where a judgment
is reversed and a new trial granted without any
specific instructions or directions, the case stands
in the lower court precisely as it did before a
trial was had in the first instance. The general
rule in this regard is well stated in 3 Ency. L.
& P. 579, in the following language:
'When a decree is reversed and the cause
remanded without specific directions, the decision of the court below is entirely abrogated,
and the cause then stands in the court below
precisely as if no trial had olcurred, and that
court has the same power over the record as it
had before its decree was rendered, and it may
permit amendments to the pleadings to the
same extent that it might have done before the
trial, and in the exercise of the same discretion, except that it is concluded by the legal
principles announced by the appellate court.
And where a cause is reversed and remanded
with directions to proceed in conformity with
the views expressed in the opinoin filed, and
it appears from such opinion that the grounds
of reversal are of a character which may be
obviated by subsequent amendments of the
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pleadings or the introduction of additional evidence ,it is the duty of the trial court to permit
the cause to be redocketed and to permit
amendments to be made and evidence introduced on the hearing just as though it was being heard for the first time' ... "
In the case of Madsen vs. Madsen, 78 Utah 84,
1 P.2d 946, the Supreme Court of Utah again had
before it the question as to the intent of the appellate
court in remanding a case. The court said:
" ... The language used in the former decision seems to be clear and unequivocal. 'Ve can
not see how it can be construed in any way
other than as vacating the judgment of the trial
court. '\Then the court says 'The judgment will
have to be set aside,' and follows those words
with, 'Such is the order,' it can only mean that the
judgment is set aside, vacated and annulled,
and, having been thus swept from existence, the
lower court has no power to breathe into any
part of it the breath of life.
The intention to vacate the entire judgment
is further evidenced by the following language
of the remittitur: 'It is ordered, adjudged and
decreed, that the judgment of the District Court
be and the same is set aside.' The order having
vacated an entire judgment, it cannot be construed as affirming any part of it.
As to whether the decision of the appellate
court necessitates a new trial after remand,
depends on the intention of the appellate court,
and where there is doubt as to this, it is generally
resolved in favor of a new trial. There is, of
course, no doubt of the intention of the appellate
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court where it has specifically ordered a new
trial. and even where the appellate court has not
specifically ordered a new trial, it is generally
held that a new trial is intended and necessary
where the case has been reversed and remanded
generally, and especially where the reversal was
for error anterior to the verdict.
Generally a judgment of reversal embracing
no special directions, simply vacates the judgment excepted to, and it is to be fallowed by a
new trial in the court below. "roods vs. Jones,
56 Ga. 520 . . . "
See also Gray vs. Defa, 153 P.2d 544, 107
Utah 272.
The case of Mcisaac vs. Hale, 135 A. 37, 105
Conn. 249, involved a factual situation similar to the one
in the present case. It was contended in the second
trial that the finding on certain issues in the first trial
which were recited in the opinion of the appellate court
was binding on the trial court in the second trial. The
Supreme Court held:
" ... The sole ground of the present appeal
is that the trial court had no right on the second
trial to reopen the issue as to the improvements
which were intended to be included in estimating
the increased rental provided in the lease, but
that the finding on the first trial and the decision
by this court concluded the parties upon that
issue. The effect of the finding of error on the
first appeal and the remanding of the case to be
proceeded with according to law was to destroy
entirely the efficacy of the judgment appealed
from and to require a new trial of all the issues
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in the case. Lewis vs. Yale, 78 Conn. 202, 207,
61 A. 634. The statements of fact in the opinion
of this court were merely the adoption of the
findings of the trial court for the purpose of the
determination of the appeal, and gave to those
findings no additional force . . . "

1t should be noted that the error for which the
Fuoco case was reversed was anterior to the verdict.
Under the _Madsen case it is clear that we were entitled
to a trial de novo of all issues.
The language of the Supreme Court decision following the unqualified statement that the "judgment
of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a new
trial" namely "with instructions to the effect that the
judge or jury should determine the matters of whether
the ditch was acquiesced in over a long period of time
as a boundary and not simply as an irrigation medium"
was obviously intended to emphasize the point on which
the court erred in the former trial. If we should construe it as a direction to determine only the one issue
the Supreme Court would not have stated unequivocably that "the judgment ... is reversed and remanded
for a new trial," but would have simply stated that
"the case is remanded to the trial court for the trial of
the question as to whether the ditch was acquiesced in
as a boundary." An order of reversal and new trial is
entirely inconsistent with a remand for the determination of one issue.
The second trial of this case proceeded as a trial
de novo. No objection was made to the introduction of
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evidence on the location of the ditch and no indication
was given at the pre-trial that we were not to have a
new trial on all issues.
It is significant that in its memorandum decision
the trial court said:
"In passing, had the entire matter been before
this court a different conclusion might have been
reached."
We submit that it was the obligation of the respondents to prove in the second trial of this case the
four elements stated in the decision of the Supreme
Court on the first appeal, Fuoco vs. Williams, 15 Utah
2d 156, 389 P.2d 143, as follows:
" . . . This court over a period of years has
formulated four elements which must be shown
by the person claiming title by acquiescence in
order to raise the presumption that a binding
agreement exists settling a dispute or uncertain
boundary. These elements are: ( l) occupation
up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings and (2) acquiescence
in the line as the boundary (3) for a long period
of years ( 4) by adjoining land owners."
The evidence referred to on pages 12-14 of the Appellants' Brief should not have been ignored by the trial
court. This shows by reference to existing physical
features where the old ditch described by the witnesses
was located. It wa.{/ on the record bou:ndary line designated "CD" on the map Exhibit P-1. This fact should
have been determinative of the case.
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2. THE RESPONDENTS HA VE FAILED

TO CALL ATTENTION IN THEIR BRIEF
TO ANY EVIDENCE OF 1llUTUAL RECOGNITION OF THE DITCH AS A BOUNDARY
LINE OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
The respondents' argument relating to proof of
mutual acquiescence consists only of general references
to testimony as to occupancy of the respondents' land
up to the ditch. This court held on the first appeal
that such evidence is not enough to show that the ditch
was considered a boundary line or that the plaintiffs'
predecessors ever acquiesced in it as a boundary line.
Fuoco vs. Williams, supra.
The evidence discussed on pages 15-18 of Appellants' Brief relating to ( l) the record ownership of
the two parcels of land, (2) the admitted fact that
during the period 1939 to 1959 the Fuoco property
was cultivated only one year, ( 3) the admitted fact
that for 19 years the Fuoco parcel was in weeds, and
( 4) the further admitted fact that for 10 years prior
thereto both parcels were cultivated by the respondent
Benjamin H. Williams' father, clearly negatives any
proof or presumption of acquiescence in the ditch as
a boundary line by the appellants' predecessors. There
is no evidence that between 1896 and 1936 Melinda
H. Butterworth ever acquiesced in the ditch as a boundary line; nor is there evidence that Annie N. M. Christensen and Effie G. Butterworth acquiesced between
1936 and 1951; nor is there evidence that between
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1951 and 1959 H. Leland Christensen so acquiesced.

This case was reversed on the first appeal for failure
of proof on this point. The respondents have again
failed to produce any evidence.
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of
the district court should again be reversed and remanded
and the district court should be directed to dismiss the
respondents' counterclaim.

E. J. SKEEN

Attorney for Appellants
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